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Abstract. Welfare states redistribute both between individuals reducing
annual inequality and over the life-cycle insuring against income risks. But
studies measuring redistribution often focus only on a one-year period. Using
German SOEP data from 1984 to 2009, long-term inequality over a 20-year
period is computed and then decomposed into an inter- and intra-individual
component. Results show that annual inequality is higher than long-term
inequality, but redistribution is also larger annually. In the long-term, the
German welfare state clearly gives priority to insurance over redistribution.
This gets even more pronounced at later stages of the life-cycle through the
payment of social security pensions.
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11 Introduction
Welfare states redistribute both between individuals (inter-individual redistribution) and
over the life-cycle of an individual (intra-individual redistribution). Transfers such as
social assistance and housing beneﬁts are clearly aimed at reducing cross-sectional in-
equality between individuals. In contrast, transfers such as sickness beneﬁts, unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and social security pensions follow motives of inter-temporal redistribution
within an individual’s life-cycle (Pettersson and Pettersson, 2007) insuring individuals
against risks. As people are generally assumed to be risk averse preferring a stable income
stream over an unstable income stream, state provided insurance aimed at smoothing
income proﬁles generates a welfare gain.
There is a large literature on inequality and welfare states’ redistribution. The eﬀect
of redistribution is mostly measured as the reduction of annual economic inequality be-
fore and after state intervention using gross and net annual incomes. Annual inequality
provides a snap shot of the inequality in one year revealing, how the welfare state re-
duces inter-individual income diﬀerences in that particular year. Beneﬁts are viewed as
pure transfers and social security contributions as pure taxes (Burkhauser and Warlick,
1981). But redistribution between people measured annually will probably overshoot
redistribution taking place in the long-term, since most of the current beneﬁciaries do
not remain beneﬁciaries throughout their lives and will support other people at a diﬀer-
ent stage of their life-cycle or of their fortunes (Layard, 1977; Liebman, 2001). On top
of this, the inﬂuence of welfare state insurance can only be taken into account in the
long-term. This is particularly important, since most of the annual aggregate redistri-
bution volume is probably due to intra-individual income smoothing (Sandmo, 1999).
In the long-term, social security contributions can be viewed as insurance premiums as
well. And pension beneﬁts from German social security can also be seen as annuities
equivalent to the contributions paid during working life rather than as intergenerational
transfers (Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001).
This study aims at broadening the view from the annual to the long-term perspective.
The most suitable approach to measure long-term inequality is to look at lifetime in-
come. However, the number of studies enquiring lifetime inequality is limited due to the
lack of data encompassing the entire life-cycle of individuals. An example for Germany
is Bönke et al. (2011). They use German social security data to estimate lifetime earn-
ings inequality. But since these data do not include all information relevant to quantify
taxes and transfers, it is not possible to draw conclusions about redistribution in the
1long-term. This study uses equivalent incomes of West German households documented
by SOEP data from 1984 to 2009, which allows to consider diﬀerent taxes and trans-
fers contingent upon the household context. Long-term income is computed as the Net
Present Value (NPV) of income streams over a 20-year period discounted by the yield
curve.
Long-term inequality is then decomposed into an inter- and intra-individual component.
Redistribution is identiﬁed as the distance between inequality components of pre- and
post-government income. In the long-term, the German welfare state clearly gives prior-
ity to insurance over redistribution. Income taxes, social security contributions, public
transfers and social security pensions enable to tackle their potential importance for
either redistribution between people or income smoothing. Children and elderly are par-
ticularly interesting in an analysis of welfare schemes as they depend on intra-household
transfers or public beneﬁts not being part of the work force yet or anymore. Therefore,
individuals are divided into six age groups reaching from 1-10 years to 51-60 years in the
ﬁrst year of observation. Hereby, the impact of diﬀerent welfare state schemes depending
on the stage of the life-cycle can be analyzed. When persons are young, state interven-
tion reduces income diﬀerences between individuals mainly through the progressive tax
system. Getting older and reaching retirement age income-smoothing redistribution via
social security pensions becomes central.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes SOEP data and income concepts
used for the analysis and lays out the methodology. Long-term inequality as measured
by the Theil coeﬃcient is decomposed into a between-group (inter-individual) and a
within-group (intra-individual) component. Section 3 oﬀers a discussion of the results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Database
The analysis is based on a subsample from the SOEP survey years 1984 to 2009. The
SOEP is a representative panel study containing individual and household data in Ger-
many from 1984 onwards. After German reuniﬁcation in 1990 the study was expanded
to the New German Laender. All household members are interviewed individually once
they reach the age of 16. The sample design ensures representativeness by oversampling
special subpopulations. These include subsamples of guest workers from 1984 onwards,
immigrants starting in 1994 and high income households from 2002 on. A critical vari-
2able in the calculation of taxable income is the year in which reported income is received.
In the SOEP as well as in most other surveys, yearly income is asked retrospectively,
e.g., the income reported in 1984 belongs to 1983.1
2.2 Sample selection
To analyze long-term income distribution, a balanced panel is required providing a com-
plete sequence of annual incomes. Seven balanced panels are constructed, each encom-
passing 20 years: 1983-2002, 1984-2003, 1985-2004, 1986-2005, 1987-2006, 1988-2007,
1989-2008. Hence, the analysis only includes individuals who participated 20 years a
row. Consequently, the sample only includes persons who live in West German house-
holds and East German households entering the SOEP after 1990 are not included in the
analysis. Persons in these households are split into six age groups such that in the ﬁrst
year, persons in the sample are 1 - 60 years old. In the 20th year, persons are 20 - 79
years old. Additionally to observed income, imputed values provided by SOEP are used.
Item non-response on income questions in the SOEP is concentrated in the tails of the
income distribution (Frick and Grabka, 2005), but only weakly associated with observ-
able variables such as human capital variables, marital status, ﬁrm size, being foreign,
and employed in public service (Biewen, 2001). According to Frick and Grabka (2005)
income inequality and income instability would be underestimated when restricting the
sample to observed income components only. Households are dropped if they exhibit
a missing income source not replaced by an imputed value. Because certain inequality
measures are not deﬁned for zero and negative values, zero market income is replaced
by 0.01 in order to include zero market incomes in the analysis.
Each age group is treated as a subsample. Thus, individuals are considered at diﬀerent
stages of their life cycle reaching from childhood to retirement. Table 1 presents the
numbers of individuals within each age group observed in each single year of the 20-
year-period.
2.3 Income concepts
The computation of long-term income follows the NPV method. Each individual i could
sell the promise to a market participant today (t = 0) of paying him his future income
1See Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005), Frick (2006) and Wagner et al. (2007) for further details.
3Table 1: Number of observed individuals
Age group age 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
-2002 -2003 -2004 -2005 -2006 -2007 -2008
1 1-10 579 542 535 517 499 488 452
2 11-20 713 648 590 514 464 429 373
3 21-30 791 783 797 765 740 722 692
4 31-40 798 775 785 761 738 698 630
5 41-50 830 833 783 736 690 661 632
6 51-60 515 486 487 483 489 485 477
Source: SOEP
xi;t at time t. If P is the price that the market is willing to pay for this promise, then
xi;t
1+i0;t gives P. The term i0;t is the interest rate for a safe investment today with time
to maturity t. The NPV indicates what future income streams accumulated over the







d0;t = 1 + i0;t
The NPV depends crucially on the discount rate d0;t chosen. One approach is to
take into account market participants’ expectations today on future interest rates and
inﬂation. The relation between interest rates i0;t and diﬀerent times to maturity t of
zero-coupon bonds without default risk is provided by the so-called yield curve. Since
the yield curve allows interest rates to vary with maturity, it is a better approximation
for expected market conditions than a constant discount factor would be. But the
yield curve function is only known with certainty for a few speciﬁc maturity dates,
because only very few zero-coupon bonds exist. Hence, the other maturities have to be
estimated. Serving as a tool for monetary policy decisions the yield curve is provided by
the Bundesbank in Germany.2 The Bundesbank applies the method of Svensson (1994)
which is an extended version of Nelson and Siegel’s (1987) approach. Following Svensson
(1994) the interest rate is the sum of a constant and three exponential terms to allow
2However, the German yield curve is only available as of 1972. Other studies use average interest rates
of government bonds (e.g., Bönke et al., 2011) or ad-hoc constant discount rates such as 3 percent
(e.g., Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held, 2001).
4for suﬃcient ﬂexibility:


















where 0;1;2;3;1 and 2 are estimated parameters. Yield curves for the years
1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 from one up to 19 years to maturity are
given in the Appendix.3 Since the NPV is sensitive to the discount rate, deﬂated long-
term incomes using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) are computed alternatively with
base year 2005.
Equivalent household income is used to consider income pooling as household members
usually share their income.4 Income pooling within a household contributes to reduce
inequality and to stabilize individual incomes provided that there is less than perfect
correlation between the income positions of the household members (Björklund and
Palme, 2002). Hence, individuals have to be analyzed in the context of their household.
Neglecting their household context and looking solely at their Individual income would
overestimate inequality in a ﬁrst stage and redistribution in a second stage. A low-wage
spouse would appear poorer and a high-income earner richer than their standard of liv-
ing in a joint household. The elevated diﬀerence between individual income inequality
and net household income inequality would be mistakenly attributed to welfare state re-
distribution alone. Indeed, the extent of redistribution through the U.S. social security
system is halved, when beneﬁts and taxes are analyzed at the family level because of the
large intra-household transfers from men to women (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001).
Second, public transfers and income taxes can be considered using household income,
because they are contingent upon the household context in Germany.
3Yield curves from 1983 to 1988 present a positive, normal slope. But the yield curve of the year 1989
reveals an inverse shape because interest rates are taken from month December, hence, succeeding
the event of German reuniﬁcation in November 1989. The German yield curve after reuniﬁcation
is an often cited example for an inverse shape not being the result of an expected recession but of
extraordinary circumstances. It is usually explained by the great demand for liquidity to ﬁnance
urgent investments. As those were mainly short-term ﬁnanced, short-term interest rates rose ("eini-
gungsbedingter Zinsanstieg"). Additionally, uncertainties regarding the scope of transfers from the
Old to the New German Laender and inﬂationary pressures because of the ongoing economic boom
contributed to increased interest rates in the end of 1989 (Bundesbank, 1991).
4Equivalent household income is derived using the OECD modiﬁed equivalence scale that assigns a
value of 1 to the household head, 0.5 to each additional adult member and 0.3 to each child.
5Table 2 presents the income concepts used in the analysis. Social security pensions
are considered separately because pensions state the greatest item in Germany’s social
budget amounting to about one third of overall expenses. As German social security pen-
sions can also be seen as annuities equivalent to the contributions, they are comparable
with private pensions and, hence, an element of gross household income before redistri-
bution.5 Gross household income including social security pensions is called modiﬁed
gross household income. Subtracting social security contributions and income taxes and
adding public transfers articulates diﬀerent stages of government intervention. Table 3
gives details on income, tax and transfer measures in the SOEP.
Table 2: Income concepts
1 Gross household income (ghi)
2 modiﬁed ghi = ghi + social security pensions
3 modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions
4 modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions - income taxes
5 Net household income = modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions - income taxes + public transfers
Source: SOEP
Table 3: From gross to net income in the SOEP
Gross household income labor earnings, asset income, private transfers, private pensions
+ Social security pensions payments from old age, disability and widowhood pension schemes
- Social security contributions pension insurance, health-care insurance, and unemployment insurance
estimated by routines described by Schwarze (1995)
- Income taxes estimated by routines described by Schwarze (1995)
+ Public transfers housing allowances, child beneﬁts, subsistence assistance,
special circumstances beneﬁts, government student assistance,
maternity beneﬁts, unemployment beneﬁts,
unemployment assistance, unemployment assistance allowance
= Net household income
Source: SOEP
5Households could decide to invest in housing as alternative to a private pension plan and to enjoy
non-monetary returns from this investment (Canberra group, 2001). Adding imputed rental value
to gross household income gives slightly lower inequality estimates than for gross household income,
especially for intra-individual inequality. The diﬀerence tends to grow with age reﬂecting the rising
signiﬁcance of housing investment, but overall the eﬀect is quite small. Results are available from
the author upon request.
62.4 Measurement of redistribution and insurance
Inequality measures are computed to answer two questions. First, how does redistri-
bution change when extending the measurement period from one to 20 years? Second,
to what extent gives the German welfare state priority to insurance over redistribution
(intra- or inter-individual inequality) in the long-term?
The ﬁrst question is addressed by computing age-speciﬁc inequality measures based on
long-term and annual incomes. First, all inequality measures are computed using long-
term incomes constructed as explained in 2.2. These measures provide inequality levels
over a 20-year period. Second, inequality levels are computed for every single year and
then averaged over the 20-year period. Comparing results for the averaged cross-section
and for the long-term gives the extent to which inequality changes when extending the
measurement period. A simple, implicit measure for redistribution is provided by the
diﬀerence between inequality measures of pre- and post-government income concepts.
Redistribution is higher annually, if the diﬀerence between pre- and post-government
income inequality is higher for the averaged cross-section than in the long-term. How-
ever, deploying this simple method may violate the Pigou-Dalton principle as it does
not control for reranking due to transfers.
To measure redistribution and insurance in the long-run, an approach by decomposing
inequality is chosen. An advantage of the Theil coeﬃcient is its simple decomposability.
The Theil coeﬃcient can be rewritten as an additive function of between-group and
within-group inequality. Each individual can be interpreted as a subgroup i(i = 1;2::n)
consisting of 20 observations per individual during each 20-year period. Thus, the Theil’s
between-group component provides a measure for inter-individual inequality and the
within-group component for intra-individual inequality. Björklund and Palme (2002)
use a similar method deploying Swedish data. Again, inequality measures are calculated
separately for age-speciﬁc subgroups. The Theil coeﬃcient ranges from 0 to
√
ln(K),























where K is the number of observations, yk is individual equivalent household income
7and y is the mean of individual equivalent household income. n is the number of individ-
uals equal to the number of subgroups, wi the individual’s weight in the total population
and i the individual’s share of age group speciﬁc total income. Individuals are weighted
using selection and staying probabilities as given in the SOEP.6
The between-group component is equivalent to before-measured long-term inequality.
Again, redistribution is measured as the distance between the components of pre- and
post-government income, where the distance between the between-group components
provides a measure for redistribution between person and the distance between the
within-group components for income smoothing.
To verify the statistical signiﬁcance of the inequality measures, the bootstrap method
is used (Mills and Zandvakili, 1997). 100 random samples with replacement are drawn
from all observations within a 20-year period. Each bootstrap sample contains as many
sampling units as the original sample. Moreover, stratiﬁed bootstrap sampling is im-
plemented to take the diﬀerent selection probabilities of the SOEP into account. The
variable "strat" documented in the SOEP indicates the strata associated with sampling
units. Per stratiﬁed bootstrap sample, inequality measure are computed. This gives 100
diﬀerent values of the inequality measures for each income concept and each 20-year-
period. Hall’s (1994) percentile conﬁdence intervals for the point estimates are then
calculated.
3 Results
First, results for annual and long-term redistribution are presented and discussed. Sec-
ond, results for Theil decomposition of long-term inequality are shown uncovering the
role of insurance and redistribution.
3.1 Annual and long-term redistribution
Figures 1 and 2 show long-term and average cross-sectional inequality as measured with
the Theil coeﬃcient. Each graph depicts the age-group-speciﬁc results for annual and
long-term inequality over seven 20-year periods. Three graphs per age group contrast
results for gross household income, modiﬁed gross household income and net household
6To properly account for selection and staying probabilities, individuals are weighted by cross-sectional
weights when computing cross-sectional inequality and by longitudinal weights when computing
long-term inequality.
8income. Each individual is assigned an equivalent household income. Long-term inequal-
ity is based on the NPV of income streams in the 20-year-period. Average cross-sectional
inequality is the 20-year average of annual inequality within the speciﬁc age group. All
graphs in Figures 1 and 2 conﬁrm that extending the measurement period decreases
the measured income inequality, since long-term inequality is lower than cross-sectional
inequality in all seven periods for all age groups and all income concepts. This is in line
with many studies conﬁrming that inequality declines when extending the measurement
period.7 When there is mobility in income over time, long-term inequality will be lower
than annual inequality as moving up and down the income distribution will make the
distribution of long-term income more equal (Shorrocks, 1978).
Furthermore, gross household income is both annually and in the long-term increasingly
unequally distributed with age. The oldest age group - aged between 51 and 60 years in
each period’s beginning and between 70 and 79 years at the end - experiences the high-
est levels of gross household income inequality, which can partly be explained by some
individuals still working and others already being retired receiving no gross household
income. To understand how redistribution changes when extending the measurement
period from one to 20 years, the distance between gross and net household income
inequality is compared for both annual and long-term income. Independent from the
measurement period, post-government distributions are more equal than pre-government
distributions conﬁrming the results of Blomquist (1981). In the long-term, inequality is
reduced by about 30 percent through state intervention, whereas annually the reduction
amounts to 35 percent. Hence, the long-term redistributive impact is smaller than the
annual incidence insinuates, which coincides with Nelissen (1998).
Children and younger people mostly receive income and transfers through their par-
ents. Gross household income inequality for children and younger persons is reduced
from about 0.18 to about 0.1 in the cross-section and from about 0.1 to about 0.06 in
the long-term. Income diﬀerences between children and younger persons are reduced
through income taxes paid by the parents and through public transfers such as child
beneﬁts. Public transfers are most important for the youngest age group compared to
the others as they contribute more than ten percent to long-term net household income
(See Table 4).
The oldest age group not only experiences the highest level of gross household income in-
equality, but also the highest reduction of both annual and long-term inequality through
7See, for example, Björklund (1993), Bönke et al. (2011), Burkhauser and Poupore (1997), Creedy
(1991), Finkel et al. (2006), Gibson et al. (2001), Kopzcuk et al. (2010), Nelissen (1998) and
Shorrocks (1978). See Wodon and Yitzhaki (2003) for a formal proof of the occurrence of this fact.
9state intervention. Income diﬀerences between elderly are strongly reduced through state
intervention from about 0.65 to about 0.1 in the cross-section and from about 0.25 to
about 0.08 in the long-term. The main eﬀect can be attributed to the payment of social
security pensions which adds to modiﬁed gross household income (see middle graph of
age group 6 in Figure 2). Social security pensions provide almost one half to net house-
hold income of elder persons. Since social security pensions have an eﬀective minimum
and maximum level, even though they reﬂect earnings from former earnings, they are
much more compressed. But still some further inequality reduction takes place when
adding public transfers and subtracting income taxes and social security contributions.
In the view of quite similar levels of net household income inequality throughout the
age groups, the welfare state seems to successfully reduce inequality among age groups,
especially for older people.
We refrain from the discussing the development over time, since time eﬀects could not
be separated properly from cohort eﬀects. Theil coeﬃcients based on CPI-deﬂated long-
term incomes show that the use of deﬂated long-term incomes states slightly higher
long-term inequality for both gross and net household income than when using the yield
curve (see Appendix). On the whole, Gini coeﬃcients given in the Appendix reproduce
results of Theil coeﬃcients.
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
The importance of the income components in long-term net equivalent household in-
come for diﬀerent age groups in the ﬁrst 20-year period 1983-2002 is given in Table 6.8
Because of the use of equivalent income also very young persons display a high share of
labor earnings which is generated by their parents. Labor earnings is the most important
income source, especially for the middle age groups. Asset income, private pensions and
social security pensions become increasingly important with age for the most part. The
opposite is true for private and public transfers that loose importance with age.
8Tables for the other 20-year periods are given in the Appendix since the shares do not vary much
across periods.
10Table 4: The share of long-term income components, 1983-2002
age group 1 2 3 4 5 6
Labor earnings 87.60 88.12 90.33 90.36 82.57 52.37
Asset income 2.38 1.71 1.97 2.37 2.79 4.25
Private transfers 0.67 0.54 0.44 0.30 0.35 0.28
Private pensions 0.16 0.27 0.15 0.16 0.89 2.96
Public transfers 7.30 5.94 5.22 4.13 3.87 3.23
Social Security Pensions 1.89 3.43 1.90 2.67 9.53 36.91
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income taxes -12.34 -13.50 -14.08 -14.94 -13.06 -8.71
Social security contributions -13.10 -14.12 -14.14 -13.52 -13.17 -9.91
Source: SOEP, own calculations
Note: All numbers are in percent and rounded such that they do not add up to 100 in all cases.
3.2 Redistribution and insurance
Decomposition of total inequality into a between-group component provides measures
for inequality and redistribution between persons and a within-group component shows
income variation and insurance within an individual’s life. Figures 3 to 7 present the re-
sults of Theil decomposition for seven 20-year periods computed for ﬁve income concepts.
Again, the focus lies on the comparison of the magnitude of between- and within-group
inequality measures and not on the development of these over time.
Results for the decomposition over the whole population and an adult group 25 years
and older are given in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.9 To take the welfare state into ac-
count, ﬁve income concepts are considered additionally to gross household income. The
eﬀect of speciﬁc welfare state measures is revealed by subtracting taxes or subtracting
taxes stepwise. The progressive tax system contributes most to even out income diﬀer-
ences, a pattern also found by Björklund and Palme (2002) in the Swedish case. Public
transfers play the second biggest role in reducing inter-individual inequality. Taxes and
public transfers are similarly important to smoothen individual income. In contrast,
the results of Björklund and Palme (2002) give public transfers a much higher weight
than income taxes on smoothing income. In summary, income taxes play a slightly more
important role for redistributing income between people, whereas income taxes and pub-
lic transfers exhibit similar importance for smoothing income. The larger reduction of
intra-individual inequality suggests that the German welfare state possibly puts more
emphasis on insurance than on redistribution. Indeed, Bartels and Bönke (2010) ﬁnd
that insurance against transitory labor market risks outweighs the reduction of perma-
9Results for the whole population and changes from one income concept to the other are given in a
Table in the Appendix.
11nent earnings diﬀerences in Germany. When considering only the adult population, as
presented in Figure 4, income variation within a life-cycle becomes more pronounced
than income diﬀerences between people. Hence, the welfare states’ role as an insurer
gains importance as the weight of older age groups increases. For the adult population
this component is reduced even more by the welfare state intervention.
[Figure 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
For almost all age groups total inequality of gross household income can be attributed
to a greater extent to intra-individual inequality as Figure 5 and 6 present. However, this
pattern gets more pronounced with age. About two thirds of total inequality within the
oldest age group is explained by intra-individuals’ diﬀerences meaning that diﬀerences
within an individual’s income stream over 20 years outweighs the diﬀerences between
persons.
Comparing gross and net household income inequality reveals that between- and within-
group inequality is reduced quite diﬀerently depending on age.10 Inter-individual in-
equality is reduced more (age group 1 and 4) or quite similarly to intra-individual in-
equality (age group 2 and 3). The role of progressive taxes and public transfers does not
diﬀer much from the pattern of the entire population seen in Figure 1.
But the picture changes for the two oldest age groups. For age group 5 and 6 state
intervention focusses on insurance reducing the within-group component far more than
the between-group component. Not surprisingly, social security pensions become cen-
tral for the two oldest age groups reaching retirement age within the period. Adding
social security pensions to gross household income brings down intra-individual inequal-
ity by as much as 70 percent for the oldest age group. This seems plausible since the
German pension system is insurance-oriented. German social security pensions include
insurance beneﬁts that depend on accumulated relative income points. But the system
also includes a redistributive component. Non-insurance beneﬁts are granted for time of
unemployment, military service, schooling, child-raising or because of early retirement
or a pension below minimum income. Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001) state that 86
percent of male social security pensions are attributable to insurance beneﬁts whereas
only 13 percent stem from non-insurance beneﬁts. For women, insurance beneﬁts are 70
10Between-group inequality in Figures 5 and 6 corresponds to long-term inequality presented in Figures
1 and 2.
12percent and non-insurance beneﬁts 30 percent where non-insurance beneﬁts are mainly
due to minimum beneﬁts. Although the authors ﬁnd that some non-insurance bene-
ﬁts, such as those for education, are given to almost every worker in the sample, they
conﬁrm redistribution between permanent earnings quintiles of the pensioners through
non-insurance beneﬁts. Indeed, the results for the oldest age group in Figure 6 clearly
show the redistributive component: Social security pensions bring down inter-individual
inequality by 57 percent. Nelissen (1998) does not distinguish between age groups, but
also ﬁnds that Dutch old-age pensions have the highest impact on reducing lifetime in-
equality even though the Dutch system largely provides ﬂat pensions. Nelissen (1998)
ﬁnds the redistributive impact of Dutch pensions to be smaller over the lifetime than
the annual incidence suggests which is conﬁrmed for Japan by Oshio (2005). As opposed
to younger age groups, public transfers and income taxes play only a minor role for age
groups 5 and 6.
Interestingly, adding social security contributions to modiﬁed gross household income
increases both inter- and intra-individual income diﬀerences, except for the two oldest
age groups. Social security contributions are payed as a ﬁxed percentage of earnings
such that contributions increase with earnings, but only up to a maximum amount. In
2008, the monthly earnings cap was at 3600 Euro for health care and 5300 for unem-
ployment insurance and social security pensions. Wagstaﬀ et al. (1999) conﬁrm that
social security contributions for health care have a regressive eﬀect in Germany. But one
should note that cash values of in-kind transfers such as medical care and utility gains
through, e.g., unemployment insurance are not accounted for in the analysis. Research
on this subject documented that including the cash value of in-kind transfers reduces
inequality measures since almost half of the welfare state transfers in rich nations con-
sists of in-kind transfers (See, e.g., Garﬁnkel et al., 2006, and Paulus et al., 2009).
[Figure 5 about here]
[Figure 6 about here]
If only one-person-households of all ages are considered, inequality of gross household
income is far higher as can be taken from Figure 7. First, income diﬀerences between
one-person-households are far higher than between larger households. Second, intra-
household income pooling cannot occur to reduce individual income variations. But the
result that the welfare states aims more at smoothing income than at redistributing
income also remains for one-person-households.
13[Figure 7 about here]
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of a redistributing welfare state on inter- and intra-
individual redistribution by including taxes and transfers such as income taxes, social
security contributions and public transfers. Long-term income is measured as the NPV
of equivalent household income streams over a 20-year period discounted by the yield
curve. The results conﬁrm the literature that inequality in the long-term is lower than
annually, but the eﬀect of redistribution is also lower when measured in the long-term.
Switching from the annual to the long-term perspective additional impacts such as in-
come smoothing via insurance payments of the social security system appear. A decom-
position approach is used to identify inequality between people and income variation
within an individual’s life (inter- and intra-individual inequality) in a ﬁrst stage and
redistribution between people and income smoothing within a life-cycle in a second
stage. Results show that the German welfare state clearly gives priority to insurance
over redistribution. The scope of this priority depends on the stage of the life-cycle.
When persons are young, state intervention also notably redistributes between people
through the progressive tax system and public transfers. Getting older and reaching
retirement age intra-individual redistribution via social security pensions becomes cen-
tral. Social security pensions reduce intra-individual inequality by 70 percent for the
oldest age group. In an individual’s life-cycle perspective one could thus conclude that
the welfare states evolves from being a poverty reliever in earlier years to an insurer in
later years. However, the presumably inequality reducing eﬀect of in-kind transfers such
as health care and education is not included in the analysis. Overall, in his role as an
insurer, social security pensions is the most important instrument of the welfare state
in smoothing income over time.
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long−term discounted average cross−section
Source: SOEP, own calculations
Notes: All income concepts are deﬁned as equivalent income using the OECD-modiﬁed equivalence scale . Dotted lines
denote Hall’s bootstrap conﬁdence intervals at 95%-level.
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Source: SOEP, own calculations
Notes: All income concepts are deﬁned as equivalent income using the OECD-modiﬁed scale. Dotted lines denote Hall’s
bootstrap conﬁdence intervals at 95%-level.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
years to maturity
1989
Note: Own calculations based on listed German Federal Treasury bonds Source:
http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.php?func=list&tr=www_s300_it03c (16.12.2011)
28Table A1: The share of long-term income components
age group 1 2 3 4 5 6
1984-2003
Labor earnings 87.19 87.63 89.80 89.86 80.99 50.61
Asset income 2.62 1.87 2.06 2.52 3.14 4.29
Private transfers 0.76 0.52 0.43 0.29 0.38 0.31
Private pensions 0.17 0.34 0.16 0.19 0.99 3.33
Public transfers 7.44 6.21 5.55 4.34 3.89 3.20
Social Security Pensions 1.82 3.43 2.01 2.80 10.62 38.26
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Income taxes -12.39 -13.54 -14.26 -14.71 -13.06 -8.46
Social security contributions -13.18 -14.28 -14.16 -13.81 -13.00 -9.96
1985-2004
Labor earnings 87.34 87.64 89.26 89.58 79.86 50.73
Asset income 2.59 1.85 2.07 2.72 3.38 4.39
Private transfers 0.72 0.56 0.42 0.32 0.40 0.25
Private pensions 0.19 0.26 0.21 0.21 1.08 3.40
Public transfers 7.51 6.44 5.84 4.25 3.95 3.53
Social Security Pensions 1.65 3.24 2.19 2.93 11.33 37.70
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Income taxes -12.34 -13.42 -14.31 -14.77 -13.08 -8.36
Social security contributions -13.29 -14.52 -14.08 -14.05 -12.88 -10.12
1986-2005
Labor earnings 86.86 87.60 89.01 89.15 79.48 51.51
Asset income 2.60 1.93 2.14 2.75 3.51 4.69
Private transfers 0.78 0.55 0.43 0.32 0.39 0.23
Private pensions 0.17 0.26 0.18 0.22 1.09 3.28
Public transfers 8.00 6.49 6.11 4.57 3.92 3.08
Social Security Pensions 1.58 3.17 2.13 2.99 11.61 37.21
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Income taxes -12.08 -13.39 -14.35 -14.64 -13.16 -8.57
Social security contributions -13.40 -14.49 -14.15 -14.13 -12.81 -10.28
1987-2006
Labor earnings 86.10 87.99 88.60 88.60 80.61 53.64
Asset income 2.75 2.05 2.15 2.99 3.66 4.71
Private transfers 0.76 0.59 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.24
Private pensions 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.22 0.98 3.15
Public transfers 8.58 6.38 6.49 4.77 3.81 3.19
Social Security Pensions 1.64 2.75 2.12 3.11 10.47 35.06
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Income taxes -11.96 -13.41 -14.23 -14.61 -13.54 -8.82
Social security contributions -13.24 -14.66 -14.27 -14.00 -12.87 -10.49
1988-2007
Labor earnings 85.46 87.65 88.29 88.48 80.22 53.12
Asset income 2.77 2.22 2.14 3.10 3.58 4.93
Private transfers 0.83 0.54 0.47 0.36 0.32 0.51
Private pensions 0.21 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.96 3.38
Public transfers 9.05 6.65 6.78 5.11 3.97 2.93
Social Security Pensions 1.68 2.69 2.13 2.70 10.96 35.13
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Income taxes -11.80 -13.29 -14.21 -14.78 -13.50 -8.80
Social security contributions -13.52 -14.63 -14.48 -13.93 -13.05 -10.54
1989-2008
Labor earnings 85.75 87.32 88.36 87.90 81.06 53.97
Asset income 2.56 2.20 2.10 3.23 3.82 4.76
Private transfers 0.90 0.59 0.50 0.34 0.33 0.47
Private pensions 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.27 0.93 3.25
Public transfers 9.12 7.04 6.93 5.38 3.84 3.18
Social Security Pensions 1.49 2.63 1.90 2.88 10.01 34.37
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Income taxes -11.87 -13.24 -14.39 -14.69 -13.95 -8.86
Social security contributions -13.77 -14.44 -14.66 -13.71 -13.07 -10.71
Source: SOEP, own calculations
Note: All numbers are in percent and rounded such that they do not add up to 100 in all cases. All income concepts are
deﬁned as equivalent income using the OECD-modiﬁed equivalence scale.
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period
discounted gross income deflated gross income
discounted net income deflated net income
age group 6
Source: SOEP, own calculations Note: All numbers are in percent and rounded such that they do not add up to 100 in
all cases. All income concepts are deﬁned as equivalent income using the OECD-modiﬁed equivalence scale.




































































































































































































long−term discounted average cross−section
Source: SOEP, own calculations Note: All numbers are in percent and rounded such that they do not add up to 100 in
all cases. All income concepts are deﬁned as equivalent income using the OECD-modiﬁed equivalence scale. Dotted lines
denote Hall’s bootstrap conﬁdence intervals at 95%-level.


















































































































































































long−term discounted average cross−section
Source: SOEP, own calculations Note: All numbers are in percent and rounded such that they do not add up to 100 in
all cases. All income concepts are deﬁned as equivalent income using the OECD-modiﬁed equivalence scale. Dotted lines
denote Hall’s bootstrap conﬁdence intervals at 95%-level.
32Table A2: Theil decomposition, all ages
income concept Total Change Between Change Within Change
1983-2002
gross household income 0.30 0.15 0.15
modiﬁed ghi = ghi + social security pensions 0.21 -0.30 0.12 -0.16 0.10 -0.31
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.22 -0.27 0.14 -0.07 0.10 -0.31
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.18 -0.41 0.11 -0.25 0.09 -0.40
- income taxes
Net household income* 0.15 -0.51 0.09 -0.36 0.08 -0.49
1984-2003
gross household income 0.28 0.15 0.13
modiﬁed ghi = ghi + social security pensions 0.19 -0.32 0.13 -0.16 0.08 -0.36
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.20 -0.28 0.14 -0.07 0.08 -0.36
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.16 -0.43 0.11 -0.25 0.07 -0.46
- income taxes
Net household income* 0.13 -0.54 0.10 -0.37 0.06 -0.56
1985-2004
gross household income 0.28 0.15 0.13
modiﬁed ghi = ghi + social security pensions 0.19 -0.32 0.13 -0.16 0.08 -0.37
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.20 -0.29 0.14 -0.07 0.08 -0.37
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.16 -0.43 0.12 -0.24 0.07 -0.47
- income taxes
Net household income* 0.13 -0.55 0.10 -0.36 0.05 -0.58
1986-2005
gross household income 0.28 0.16 0.13
modiﬁed ghi = ghi + social security pensions 0.19 -0.32 0.13 -0.16 0.08 -0.38
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.20 -0.28 0.15 -0.07 0.08 -0.38
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.16 -0.43 0.12 -0.23 0.07 -0.48
- income taxes
Net household income* 0.13 -0.55 0.10 -0.36 0.05 -0.60
1987-2006
gross household income 0.30 0.16 0.14
modiﬁed ghi = ghi + social security pensions 0.21 -0.29 0.14 -0.14 0.09 -0.34
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.22 -0.25 0.15 -0.05 0.10 -0.34
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.18 -0.39 0.12 -0.22 0.08 -0.43
- income taxes
Net household income* 0.15 -0.51 0.10 -0.34 0.07 -0.54
1988-2007
gross household income 0.30 0.16 0.14
modiﬁed ghi = ghi + social security pensions 0.21 -0.30 0.14 -0.14 0.09 -0.35
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.22 -0.26 0.16 -0.05 0.09 -0.35
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.18 -0.40 0.13 -0.21 0.08 -0.44
- income taxes
Net household income* 0.14 -0.52 0.11 -0.34 0.06 -0.55
1989-2008
gross household income 0.32 0.16 0.14
modiﬁed ghi = ghi + social security pensions 0.23 -0.29 0.14 -0.14 0.09 -0.34
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.24 -0.25 0.16 -0.04 0.09 -0.34
modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions 0.19 -0.39 0.13 -0.21 0.08 -0.43
- income taxes
Net household income* 0.15 -0.52 0.11 -0.34 0.07 -0.54
Source: SOEP, own calculations
Note: All income concepts are deﬁned as equivalent income using the OECD-modiﬁed equivalence scale.
*Net household income = modiﬁed ghi - social security contributions - income taxes + public transfers
33